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Abstract 
Background. Early-stage accelerator programs teach new entrepreneurs how to identify and exploit venture 
opportunities. In doing so, they implicitly teach these new entrepreneurs how to develop and iterate claims. But since this 
function of teaching persuasion has been implicit and generally unsystematic, it’s unclear how well it works.  
Literature Review. We review related literature on the venture development process, value propositions, and logic 
orientation (Goods-Dominant vs. Service-Dominant Logic). 
Research Questions. Does an entrepreneurship training program implicitly teach new entrepreneurs to make and 
iterate persuasive claims? How effectively does it do this, and how can it improve? 
Research Methodology. We examine one such accelerator program via a qualitative case study. In this case study, 
we collected interviews, observations, and artifacts, then analyzed them with thematic coding. 
Results/Discussion. All teams had received previous entrepreneurship training and mentoring. However, they 
differed in their problem and logic orientations as well as their stage in the venture development process. These differences 
related to the extent to which they iterated value propositions in the program.  
Conclusions. We conclude with recommendations for improving how accelerator programs can better train new 
entrepreneurs to communicate and persuade. 
 
Index Terms - Entrepreneurship communication, entrepreneurial rhetoric, accelerator, value proposition. 
Introduction 
In the summer of 2017, a firm we’ll call W1 entered the Student Entrepreneurship Acceleration and Launch (SEAL) 
program at the University of Texas. W1’s business pitch was straightforward. Invasive species—specifically zebra mussels 
and quagga mussels—had begun appearing in Texas lakes. Once established in a lake, these mollusks would crowd out other 
aquatic wildlife. Worse, they could also ruin the water purification equipment that allowed local towns to use these lakes as 
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water supplies. But current methods of detecting these mollusks were unreliable, and current methods of eradicating them 
were both expensive and damaging to the environment. W1 offered a new, far less expensive and more reliable way to 
provide early detection. This was indeed a problem; but did it represent an opportunity for a venture? Through SEAL, W1 
would find out whether this venture concept was a “Go” (a viable opportunity) or a “No Go” (an impractical one). 
Accelerator programs such as SEAL typically focus on startup teams pursuing a venture opportunity, helping them 
to develop business models and funding pitches (cf. [33]). Accelerators 
help ventures define and build their initial products, identify promising customer segments, and secure resources, 
including capital and employees. More specifically, accelerator programs are programs of limited-duration—lasting 
about three months—that help cohorts of startups with the new venture process. They usually provide a small 
amount of seed capital, plus working space. They also offer a plethora of networking opportunities, with both peer 
ventures and mentors, who might be successful entrepreneurs, program graduates, venture capitalists, angel 
investors, or even corporate executives. Finally, most programs end with a grand event, a “demo day” where 
ventures pitch to a large audience of qualified investors. ([7], p.19) 
Accelerators often “take an equity stake in the ventures participating in the programs” ([8], p.11). They typically 
bring startups in as cohorts [8; 22]. 
Unlike typical accelerator programs, but like many other college-based programs addressing student ventures, 
SEAL is shorter (only 9 weeks during the summer), does not provide seed capital, and does not take an equity stake. Most 
importantly, SEAL does not involve exploiting the venture opportunity. Instead, its focus is on an earlier stage: determining 
if the venture should be a “Go” (that is, if the startup should launch the venture) or a “No Go” (that is, if the startup should 
abandon the venture).  
Before startups get to the point of exploiting a venture opportunity, they must first generate a venture idea, turn it 
into a venture concept, and evaluate it to determine whether a desirable, feasible opportunity exists. Part of determining 
whether the opportunity is desirable involves developing a claim for value to an intended market—a value proposition—and 
iterating that claim with feedback from members of the market. That is, teaching entrepreneurs how to develop and iterate 
claims is a core function of such programs. 
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However, although it is a core function, persuasion is not systematically taught in such programs: this function of 
teaching persuasion has been implicit and generally unsystematic, relying on situated experience rather than established 
principles of persuasion. Indeed, scholars are only in the early stages of studying entrepreneurship communication [31] and 
the rhetoric of entrepreneurship [30].  
In this cross-disciplinary qualitative study, we examine SEAL. This program covers the second stage of venture 
development, in which a venture concept is incubated, leading to a Go/No Go decision, which is based in part on whether 
the entrepreneur can identify a persuasive value proposition. We ask: Does an entrepreneurship training program implicitly 
teach new entrepreneurs to make and iterate persuasive claims? How effectively does it do this, and how can it improve? 
We conclude with recommendations for improving how accelerator programs can teach new entrepreneurs to communicate 
and persuade. 
The program 
SEAL is a nine-week summer program designed to help student teams identify and address threats to their new 
technology-based ventures. In SEAL, teams such as W1 examine market interest, technology fit and function, and the ability 
to create a differentiated value proposition. These teams identify key challenges; test business and technology claims in the 
marketplace; define their value propositions; and communicate their decision to launch (“Go”), stop development (“No 
Go”), or change strategy (“Pivot”). SEAL differs from other accelerator programs in two ways.  
First: in theory, teams all start with a technology from their academic research or program; during SEAL, they 
explore whether a business can be built around this innovation. This orientation is different from most other accelerator 
programs, which start with a business problem and seek to develop products to address it. (In practice, as discussed below, 
we found that SEAL’s 2017 firms were a mix of technology-first and problem-first firms.) Rather than incubating the 
technology, SEAL incubates the concept of converting the technology into a business proposition.  
Second: the objective of the program is this Go/No Go decision. Firms leave the program with clarity on whether 
the business is worth pursuing. That is, firms come into the program with a venture idea; they use the program to incubate a 
venture concept; and at the end of the program, they decide whether to exploit a venture opportunity [39]. SEAL’s Go/No 
Go decision thus orients teams such as W1 toward making an evidence-based argument to themselves and others: can this 
innovation anchor a viable business?  
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SEAL is one of the oldest student accelerator programs in the country. Other student accelerator programs include 
the Polsky Accelerator and the New Venture Challenge (both at the University of Chicago), VentureCat (Northwestern), 
OwlSpark (Rice University), RED Labs (University of Houston), the Louis H. Stumberg Venture Competition (Trinity 
University), the Desai Accelerator (University of Michigan), Madworks (University of Wisconsin, Madison), MN Cup 
(University of Minnesota), Cozad New Venture Challenge (University of Illinois), and LaunchCMU (Carnegie-Mellon 
University). These student accelerator programs vary along at least these dimensions: Education of the student vs. 
advancement of the startup; open to just students, or to alumni, or to the public; funding vs. no funding; and virtual vs. co-
working (on-location work). The general thrust of most student accelerator programs is to stimulate customer discovery data, 
integrate into a polished pitch and use presentations as a medium to engage mentor and funding networks. Judges and funding 
groups provide the critical feedback determining the future of the student-initiated enterprises. Thus, the “pitch” is the focus 
or the “outcome” from the acceleration program which communicates the business proposition to external stakeholders for 
feedback and awards. This approach contrasts with SEAL, which uses a “pitch” format for presentation of data, but seeks 
team agreement regarding viability of proposed enterprise based on data, mentor feedback and ability to address key business 
risks. This focus on entrepreneurial decision making is communicated through the team’s Go/No Go decision presented 
along with their pitch at SEAL Decision Day. Although much training content, engagement of mentor networks and use of 
a “pitch” to present business progress are common among student accelerators, the emphasis of commitment to start and 
sustain the proposed enterprise -- the Go/No Go decision -- appears rather unique for the SEAL program. 
The structure 
SEAL began in 2009. Although some student acceleration programs began in 2007 or earlier (Venture Cat and 
Polsky Accelerator), most student accelerators began in 2012 or later. In 2017, in addition to unstructured mentoring, SEAL 
structured mandatory events intended to help teams develop. Features (Figure 1) included: 
Kickoff pitches: Teams initially delivered existing, 12-minute pre-SEAL pitches.  
Mentor surveys: Mentors completed feedback forms (BPPFFs) evaluating each kickoff pitch immediately 
afterwards. Program directors tabulated the feedback to help teams set goals and needs. 
Coworking space: All teams were given access to a coworking space on campus, with the intention of fostering 
lateral communication and learning across teams—a “support group for entrepreneurs” (Winkler et al. 2018, p.158). 
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Lunch and learns: All teams attended four 2.5-hour catered events in which guest speakers discussed 
entrepreneurship-related topics. 
Workshops: All teams attended four 2-hour workshops in which guest speakers discussed entrepreneurship-related 
topics, delivered foundational lectures, and answered teams’ questions.  
A video course: All teams had access to a video course on building companies. Teams were encouraged to watch 
this course at their own pace; not all did.  
Mentorship: All teams had unstructured meetings with 2-5 assigned mentors familiar with their sector (healthcare, 
Internet, water technology, transportation).  
Decision Day pitches: At the end of SEAL, teams delivered their final, 5-minute pitches, including their Go/No 
Go decision. 
 
Figure 1. Components of SEAL 2017. 
Literature Review 
To better understand SEAL, we drew on and integrated three areas of the literature. We reviewed the venture 
development process to better understand what sorts of arguments ventures had to make at different stages, and to whom. 
We reviewed goods-dominant logic and service-dominant logic to better understand perceived grounds of these arguments, 
specifically value propositions. Finally, we reviewed the literature on value proposition iteration to better understand how 
entrepreneurs’ arguments developed over time. In integrating these three areas of the literature, we were able to better 
understand persuasion in early-stage entrepreneurship, persuasion that has often been discussed and taught only implicitly. 
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In this literature review, we mainly drew on entrepreneurship literature. Unfortunately, although this body of 
literature discusses persuasion, it typically does not draw systematically or adequately from studies of persuasion grounded 
in rhetoric [29]. For instance, the entrepreneurship literature examines the explicitly persuasive genre of pitch presentations, 
but tends to focus on performative aspects such as passion or on demonstrating command of facts via preparedness and 
cognitive legitimacy [4, 6, 10, 15, 21, 40]. More broadly, the entrepreneurship literature discusses rhetoric, but inconsistently. 
Sometimes it is used in the relatively expansive Aristotelian or communication senses (e.g., Alvesson 1993, 2001; Green 
2004; Green and Li 2011). But more often, rhetoric is invoked in a narrower stylistic sense: For instance, Suddaby and Viale 
(2011) argued that “discourse operates at a macro-social level and, while it reflects extant power positions within society, 
discourse is not particularly associated with the agency or intentionality of individual actors” whereas “rhetoric...operates at 
much lower levels of analysis [emphasis added], such as the organizational field, and is much more intentional or agentic” 
(p. 434). Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) likened rhetorical analysis to discourse analysis: “Rhetorical analysis shares 
[discourse analysis’] interest in the role of language in structuring social action but is distinguished by a very specific focus 
on suasion and influence. In this context, rhetoric forms a sub-set of discourse analysis” that is focused on “explicitly political 
or interest-laden discourse” (pp. 39–40). In this context, Suddaby, Foster, Quinn, and Trank (2010) explored “rhetorical 
history” as a story that management tells in a firm, one that reflects the deliberate, “manipulated” (p. 157) remembering and 
forgetting of organizational memory. Similarly, Ruebottom (2013) identified rhetoric as having “microstructures” of 
language such as “vocabulary sets and rhetorical devices,” which “are building blocks of rhetorical strategy” (p. 101). And 
Van Werven, Bouwmeester, and Cornelissen (2015) located “the power of arguments” in a typology that “provides a base 
for future research on the micro-discursive processes through which entrepreneurs claim, and in turn achieve, legitimate 
distinctiveness for their ventures” (p. 616). These conceptualizations of rhetorical persuasion tend to cast rhetoric as a 
manipulation of micro-discursive features to achieve persuasive effects; they are not adequate for analyzing how 
entrepreneurs revise their broader arguments (such as their claims and the claims’ relations to evidence). For that reason, we 
supplement our discussion with literature from rhetoric and professional communication research. 
The venture development process 
Ideas are not just products: to successfully commercialize an idea, the entrepreneur must develop a venture concept 
(including a value proposition that makes the offering appealing for a customer segment), then evaluate whether it constitutes 
a true opportunity. This process has been depicted in several conceptual frameworks (reviewed and synthesized in [39]). 
The entrepreneur iterates the venture via feedback from external players, shaping and refining the concept for 
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appropriateness, fit and possible success in the marketplace [17]. Vogel’s model [39] (see Figure 2) demonstrates how 
venture ideas emerge from triggers, are developed into concepts via iterative feedback, and are then implemented as venture 
opportunities. In the first stage, venture ideas arise from observations, market insight or experience that point to potential 
value, but these ideas are still ill-defined and not yet actionable [13]. In the second stage, these ideas are iteratively 
investigated, resulting in a venture concept that links customer need and customer definition with the venture’s offering [20]. 
In the third stage, the concept matures into an actual venture opportunity by uniting the concept with market conditions and 
the entrepreneurs’ own goals and beliefs [17], resulting in a plan to bring a product or service to the marketplace that offers 
differentiated value. SEAL supports the venture concept stage, ending at the point of evaluation (the Go/No Go decision). 
 
Figure 2.  Vogel’s [39] model of the idea-to-opportunity process. 
Key to this process is the development of the value proposition, which happens during this incubation stage. The 
key elements of a value proposition are the linkages between customer need, customer definition or segmentation and the 
entrepreneur’s offering [19] as well as the resources and capabilities. As Figure 2 shows, this process is iterative and often 
unpredictable, involving data collection, analysis and new proposition testing. If, at the point of evaluation, the entrepreneur 
believes that a desirable and feasible viable opportunity exists, s/he makes a Go decision and begins planning operational 
business strategy [5]. Otherwise, the entrepreneur makes a No Go decision, and then must either (a) adapt the value 
proposition for new market segments, (b) find additional resources and relationships to answer key questions, or (c) abandon 
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the concept altogether [23]. In making this Go/No Go decision, entrepreneurs must be able to consolidate and communicate 
their value propositions to key stakeholders—and to themselves [17].  
Value propositions as GDL and SDL claims 
When firms such as W1 move from a venture idea to concept to opportunity, they must conceptualize the offering’s 
value proposition not as a generic good but as a service that benefits specific stakeholders. As claims about value, value 
propositions can be seen as following one of two different logics: goods-dominant logic (GDL) or service-dominant logic 
(SDL). 
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith [26] popularized the “good” as the service unit of exchange (i.e., exchange 
value). Since that time, marketing has typically focused on the value that is inherent to the product being sold by the firm—
that is, it has followed what Vargo and Lusch [38; cf. 16] call goods-dominant logic (GDL). In GDL, claims about value are 
descriptive claims, focusing on the features of the product. For commodities, such descriptive claims are enough; buyers 
have a good idea of the problem the product solves, and thus are mostly interested in the product’s specifications. 
Since most teams entering SEAL, including W1, have an established technology or product set, they typically take 
a GDL approach to conceptualizing and describing their innovation. Yet a GDL approach to understanding value creation is 
too limiting for commercializing new technologies: GDL does not consider the use-value. Vargo and Lusch [38] argue for 
applying service-dominant logic (SDL), in which the value of the product is understood as co-created by firm and customer. 
In SDL, claims about value are proposal claims, focusing on the potential value of integrating the solution into the customer’s 
operations [14]. SDL is better suited for emerging offerings, such as the new technologies that SEAL’s firms have produced. 
In those conditions, the co-creation between consumer and producer leads to more innovative value propositions that are 
more persuasive for customers because they identify and address market pain.  
Research Questions 
Based on this literature review, to better understand what teams were learning about persuasion in SEAL, we asked 
two questions:  
● Does SEAL implicitly teach new entrepreneurs to make and iterate persuasive claims? That is, although SEAL did 
not include an explicit component on persuasion, did it implicitly include persuasive instruction in its programming, 
final products, and unstructured components such as mentoring? 
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● How effectively does it do this, and how can it improve? That is, did entrepreneurs develop their persuasive claims 
throughout the program? Did they iterate these claims? If so, how? If not, why not? Based on this analysis, can 
SEAL improve its instruction on persuasive claims? 
Research Methodology  
To answer these questions, we developed an exploratory, qualitative case study, using conventional qualitative 
methods for collecting and analyzing data [9, 8, 12]. In terms of understanding changes in persuasion, this case study allowed 
us to examine the data diachronically: We collected perceptions by both entrepreneurs and mentors at different points in the 
program, including their understandings of the central claim (the value proposition), and we also examined iterations in 
documents (pitch decks) and oral pitches. In terms of understanding the program, we were able to observe training as it 
occurred throughout. Finally, we were able to discuss suggested improvements to the program with entrepreneurs and 
mentors. Additional methodological details are in [32]. Below, we discuss the entrepreneurship training program, along with 
participant selection, data collection, reduction, and analysis procedures.  
In 2017, SEAL had 17 teams, including W1. After their kickoff pitches, mentors ranked these teams via Feedback 
Forms (BPPFFs): up to 18 mentors individually rated each team on a 1-5 scale for multiple criteria, including “Investment 
Potential: The business represents a real investment opportunity.” This criterion functioned as an overall summary of the 
mentor’s impressions: it represented a judgment based on all of the previous criteria.  
To select the sample for this study, researchers took the average of the mentors’ scores for Investment Potential for 
each of the 17 firms. The firms were then sorted based on their average Investment Potential scores and every other firm 
was selected, for a total of 8 firms (47%) in the sample. Firms were then approached. If a firm said no to interviews, an 
adjacent firm on the ranked list (i.e., ranked either the next higher or the next lower) was approached. Two firms said no, 
and a third did not respond.  
This strategy yielded a sample with a range of readiness; a range of industries; firms approaching different markets; 
and firms with different categories of innovations (healthcare, information technology, transportation, water technology). 
Data collection and analysis 
We collected the following data: Initial and final pitch decks; mentor surveys based on the initial (kickoff) pitches; 
videos of initial and final pitches;  observations of structured training (five Lunch and Learns and three workshops); 
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semistructured interviews with selected team leads at the beginning and end of the program; and semistructured interviews 
with selected teams’ mentors. 
The eight selected firms (Table 1) represented a mix of investment potential as assessed by mentors. Data were 
reduced further by coding data and investigating specific themes.  







Business type Short description Degree being 
earned (or 
recently earned) 
by lead innovator 
I1 2.66 Information 
Technology  
A voice recognition platform for improving the 
hotel experience.  
Bachelor’s 
H1 3.07 Healthcare A simplified, mobile-first electronic medical 
records system targeted to developing markets. 
Bachelor’s 
W1 3.09 Water 
Technology 
Molecular solutions for detecting and 
mitigating invasive species in lakes. 
Ph.D. 
I2 3.13 Information 
Technology  
A personal relationship manager app. Bachelor’s 
W2 3.5 Water 
Technology 
A device for reducing water waste during 
shower warm-up. The device would be 
marketed to hotels and would also offer water 
analytics. 
Bachelor’s 
T1 3.64 Transportation Practical levitation technology. Master’s 
I3 3.77 Information 
Technology  
A distributed market for renting personal 
parking spaces during events; AirBnB for 
parking spaces. 
Bachelor’s 
H2 4.21 Healthcare An instrument allowing scientists and 
technicians to accurately identify the proteome 




Data collection involved the following methods: 
Pitch decks. The initial and final pitch decks were collected for each team’s pitch. 
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BPPFFs. SEAL surveyed program mentors for their evaluations after each kickoff pitch. In these surveys, 
mentors circled choices on a Likert scale for each pitch characteristic and optionally added comments. The research team 
collected 238 responses, of which 108 responded to the firms in the sample. Researchers stored results in a database. 
Videorecorded pitches. For all firms, SEAL videorecorded 15-minute pitches at kickoff and 5-minute pitches on 
Demo Day. 
Structured training. SEAL provided two types of structured training during the program: five 2.5-hour “Lunch 
and Learns” and three 2-hour workshops. These training sessions were attended by a member of the research team, who 
took observational notes, and were videorecorded.  
Semistructured initial interviews with selected 2017 SEAL program team leads. During SEAL’s first two 
weeks, representatives of each selected team gave initial interviews, focusing on the team’s current pitch and value 
proposition. Interviews took 9-26 minutes. (See Table 2.) 
Semistructured final interviews with selected 2017 SEAL program team leads. During SEAL’s final week, 
representatives of each selected team gave final interviews, focusing on how the team evolved the pitch and value 
proposition over time. Interviews took 9-25 minutes. (See Table 2.) 
Semistructured interviews with selected 2017 SEAL program mentors. After the team interviews, three 
mentors were interviewed about how each team evolved the pitch and value proposition over time. Interviews took 15-21 
minutes. (See Table 2.) 









Firms mentored Final 
interview 
I1 26:52 25:01  13 H1, I2, I3 14:55 
I2 17:11 14:06  20 H2, I1, I3, T1 21:09 
I3 13:30 15:21  26 W1, W2 17:43 
H1 13:18 10:31     
H2 20:20 20:41     
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T1 9:34 9:23     
W1 19:02 14:50     
W2 20:46 24:22     
 
All interviews were transcribed, then coded and triangulated. We coded three datasets: (a) initial interviews with 
firms, (b) final interviews with firms, and (c) interviews with mentors. Coding was non-exclusive. Entries were coded under 
Author 1’s direction, initially using descriptive starter codes [18, 25] based on central concerns implied within the theoretical 
frame. Next, we performed open coding [9] to inductively identify recurrent themes related to problematization, 
interessement, and value proposition statements and transformations. 
Once we identified themes in codes, we used other datasets to confirm and illustrate them, examining how firms 
transformed their value propositions between pitch decks.  
Triangulation 
We also triangulated datasets, comparing interview statements with each other and with other data. Specifically, 
we triangulated along these lines: 
The initial value proposition. We compared firms’ initial interview statements about their value propositions with 
their initial (kickoff) pitch decks. 
The initial understanding of their challenges. We compared firms’ initial interview statements about their 
challenges with the kickoff mentor forms. 
Changes in the value proposition. We compared firms’ initial and final interview statements about their value 
propositions’ initial and final pitch decks with their mentors’ interviews. 
Outcome. We compared the firms’ changes in their value proposition to their Decision Day outcome (Go, No Go, 
or Pivot) and rationale. 
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Results/Discussion 
Based on this analysis, we first discuss firms’ entrepreneurship training backgrounds, their orientations to the 
problem, their logic orientations, and their point in the Vogel cycle. This discussion allowed us to investigate two questions: 
Does SEAL implicitly teach new entrepreneurs to make and iterate persuasive claims? How effectively does it do this, and 
how can it improve? .  
We found that the entrepreneurs had all received some sort of entrepreneurship training or mentoring before SEAL. 
Interestingly, the majority of entrepreneurs in our sample were oriented to a problem rather than a technology, a disjuncture 
that affected their fit in the program (which had been structured to help technology-oriented innovators). Entrepreneurs 
generally began with a GDL orientation, but, despite the lack of formal persuasion instruction in the structured component 
of the program, many moved to an SDL orientation by the end due to the unstructured component: direct and indirect 
feedback from mentors. Perhaps most critically, we found that entrepreneur teams were at different points in the Vogel cycle, 
meaning that some were too early to benefit from the program and others were too late. 
Entrepreneurship training and mentoring 
All interviewees had received entrepreneurship training, worked with mentors, and/or worked in an accelerator or 
incubator. For instance, I3 studied entrepreneurial management in college and was mentored by an alumni investment group. 
I1, I2, and T1 all participated in the same accelerator at their university. W1 was in a bioscience incubator attached to a 
community college, while W2 had “16 advisors/mentors” and was simultaneously participating in “four different incubators” 
(including SEAL). 
In fact, one firm (H2) had gone through the SEAL program two years earlier; at that earlier stage, the team had 
decided to defer developing the business until they had developed their technology further. Between their two times in the 
SEAL program, they participated in an NSF I-Corps program and in two competitions. 
One interviewee had taken business classes and was simultaneously working with another summer accelerator 
program at another university (H1).  
Firms’ orientations to the problem 
Firms in this sample worked in four broad domains: information technology, health sciences, water technology 
(including W1), and transportation. Firms varied widely in focus and entrepreneurship education.  
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SEAL is designed to support teams that have developed a working technology, but must determine whether it can 
support a business (“technology-first”). This orientation contrasts with most traditional incubators, whose teams address a 
known problem  by developing a new technology (“problem-first”). However, SEAL 2017 firms were a mixture of 
technology-first and problem-first teams. 
The two technology-first firms (H2, T1) were built on technologies developed by advanced degree holders within 
university research. Thus these technologies were relatively stable, but the firms were new to considering business 
applications and market pain. Since these firms tended to be formed around technology developed in long-term funded 
research programs, their main challenge was to find market pain that could be solved by the existing technology. These 
technologies were grounded in deep technical expertise and were not easily changed. Nor were the technology developers 
(university researchers) familiar with the communications and reward structure of business, as mentor M1 pointed out (cf. 
[27], p.27). 
The four problem-first firms (I1, I2, I3, H1) were all built by undergraduates. They identified market pain first, then 
used readily available technology to address it. They also had short development time (6-10 months). For these firms, the 
main challenge was to quickly develop technology that could address the market pain; they had little investment in the 
technology itself.  
Between these two types were the two water technology firms (W1, W2), both of which applied familiar, malleable 
technology to an unfamiliar domain. The founder of W2, an undergraduate, “was playing with an Arduino [an open-source 
electronic prototyping platform], and I always wanted a shower that I could use as an alarm clock.” Once he developed the 
basic technology, he and partners “started talking to different markets, the apartment market, thinking about residential. The 
product changed, our market changed, and we found research” leading them to the new business idea. The idea again changed 
drastically as W2 began talking to potential customers at hotels. That is, W2 had iterated the product several times before 
even entering SEAL. The founder of W1, a Ph.D.-holding biologist specializing in cancer research, heard about the problem 
of invasive species in Texas lakes and applied ideas from “early diagnostics for early stage cancers” to the new domain. 
Similar to cancer research, W1’s approach initially focused on early detection and prevention. For both of these firms, the 
challenge was to synchronize a malleable technology with a problem in an unfamiliar domain. 
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Firms’ logic orientations: GDL and SDL 
As noted earlier, firms can understand their value propositions in terms of GDL or SDL. Our previous research has 
suggested that, for early-stage technologies, SDL is a more persuasive orientation, yet technology innovators who are 
learning to be entrepreneurs often default to GDL and must be taught to reorient to SDL.  
Firms offered their value propositions for the first time during their kickoff pitches. These initial value propositions 
varied considerably.  
All but one firm (T1, which had been thinking about commercializing the technology for “a week”) articulated an 
initial value proposition in the pitch deck. These value propositions tended to be GDL: they mainly described features rather 
than proposing benefits oriented to a specific problem. All but H2 and I3 emphasized the technology’s specifications in their 
pitch decks; H2 and I3 partially framed the technology as a service in their value propositions (SDL).  
Mentors noticed: their feedback for this kickoff pitch pressed the firms to move from description to proposal 
arguments. In the metric that was most relevant for the value proposition, “Problem/Solution clearly described,” mentors 
consistently rated W1 most highly; their qualitative comments praised W1 for identifying a “clear need, application” and 
“Addressing important problem,” and their criticism centered on execution: “What is it going to take to get this done?” The 
second highest rated, I2, received a split judgement on the question: those who rated it highly saw a clear answer to a problem 
(“solves an important problem, need to target specific business i.e. vertical”) while those who rated it poorly indicated that 
I2 had not identified a problem at all: (“What is the users [sic] problem? Why is this a big opp?”).  
On the other end, firms that rated low on this question did not effectively propose a solution to a specifically defined, 
well-explored problem. One mentor commented on H1’s presentation that “I suspect there's a great product here, but we 
didn't get enough info on what the meat of the product is, the value [proposition], the [benefits], the technical needs, etc.” 
For W2, one mentor commented that although a basic problem had been identified: “Your challenge this summer will be 
transitioning [W2] from a product into a business”—a move that would involve thoroughly investigating the size, 
characteristics, and needs of the market as well as the product’s lifespan.  
The most variation in mentors’ feedback showed up in ratings for I1 and T1, the firms with the most recent business 
ideas (6 months and 1 week). Mentors commented that I1’s problem statement “was a bit muddled” and “vague,” and one 
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cautioned that I1 had not thought through the competitive landscape. Similarly, they commented that T1’s pitch “is a tech 
right now” and T1 should be “developing a project/ biz plan.” 
In their initial interviews, firms provided more insight on their value propositions, which tended to be technology 
descriptions (GDL) rather than proposals (SDL).  
In sum, at the beginning of the SEAL program, firms were generally oriented to GDL—that is, they generally 
offered specific descriptions of their technologies’ features rather than proposed benefits. These descriptions did not answer 
one or both of these critical questions posed by mentors: What problem would the product solve and what value would it 
bring (H1, I1, I2, T1)? How could the problem be solved in a way that would create a sustainable business (H2, I3, T1, W1, 
W2)? 
Eight weeks later, all firms had iterated their value propositions to answer such questions. The Demo Day format 
did not collect BPPFFs from mentors, but we examined the shift in value propositions from initial to final decks, triangulating 
these with in-process interviews with firms and mentors. Table 1 shows how selected firms articulated value propositions in 
slide decks.  
Table 3. How selected firms articulated value propositions. 
Firm Written value proposition from kickoff deck Written value proposition from Demo Day deck 
I1 “For travelers: 




Data mining, Analytics” (Slide 4) 
"In-room voice assistants will create a better customer experience 
for travelers and increase hotel’s daily RevPAR (revenue per 
available room)" (slide 2) 
T1 (No value proposition statement; the deck identifies potential 
markets and applications.) 
"A patent-pending air levitation design 
Maglev heights at a fraction of the cost 
30% cheaper build minus SURFACE COST! 
Designed to levitate a train and make MagLev Irrelevant!" (slide 
4) 
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W1 “Solutions: Early Detection”; emphasizes novelty, flexibility, 
cost (Slide 8) 
“Solutions: Equipment”; emphasizes automation, data quality 
(Slide 9) 
“Solutions: Eradication”; emphasizes specificity and low cost 
(Slide 10) 
"[W1] Eradication = Specific, Efficient, Scalable 
Species Specific 
Proven Technology in Oncology and Human Health Applications 
Large Scale Production at Low Cost" (slide 9) 
 
As expected, the technology-first firms (H2, T1) iterated their value propositions the least. Both retained a GDL orientation, 
describing their technology’s features rather than positioning the technology as a solution to specific market pain. For 
instance, H2 described its technology as “A platform technology providing single molecule level protein information” (slide 
2) and illustrated how this technology could replace four other components; but H2 did not explicitly explain how this 
replacement solved a problem. H2 iterated both its argument and its application. H2 planned to offer services to 
pharmaceutical companies in the short term, giving the firm the time and investment to develop and sell products 
(instruments, consumables) in the long term. Yet, as mentor M2 noted, their value proposition did not identify specific 
market pain that was acute enough to motivate customers to immediately pay for a solution. They were  
Two to five years, maybe 10 years ahead of the market in terms of their ambition and what their tech can 
do. It's a very common thing and being too early is the same thing as being wrong as far as an investor's concerned. 
... They needed to hone in on, “Here’s the market where we can get into immediately, prove our technology. It’s 
decent enough sized that we can, with a modest investment, grow to a good size to where we're ready to raise 
significant, probably eight to nine figures of capital.” 
To do this, H2 would need new skills, and “that’s a hard ask of someone to develop a bunch of soft skills when they are used 
to ‘I’m rewarded for being the best at whatever in my field.’” 
Similarly, T1 offered a benefit—“Maglev heights at a fraction of the cost” (slide 4)—and described specific 
products that could be built with the technology, but did not articulate a specific problem or a business that could be built 
around the technology. 
The problem-first firms (H1, I1, I2, I3) iterated their value propositions, generally toward an SDL orientation. For 
instance, whereas H1’s initial value proposition was a list of features, the revised value proposition claimed that the product 
delivered specific benefits that were critical to an audience: it “instantly empowers healthcare workers to provide the best 
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quality of care, at the best possible price.” I2 and I3 both communicated their value propositions by using SDL-oriented 
quotes from actual customers. Table 4 illustrates I1’s value proposition iterations in more detail. 
Table 4. I1’s value proposition iterations. 
Written value proposition from kickoff deck “For travelers: 




Data mining, Analytics” (Slide 4) 
Spoken value proposition (interview 1) “My value proposition is to hotel saying, "You pay for this software service and you 
let people interact with this for free. What we’re charging you for is the analysis of 
how people interact." The behavior interaction, providing you reports, visualization of 
that data, insight that we're pulling from that data. … the value proposition is in we're 
providing insight on data analysis.” 
Written value proposition from Demo Day deck "In-room voice assistants will create a better customer experience for travelers and 
increase hotel’s daily RevPAR (revenue per available room)" (slide 2) 
Spoken value proposition (interview 2) "a way to communicate and customize the experience.... insight and truly providing a 
good experience for their customers, but insight into what those customers want." 
Value proposition iterations ARGUMENT 
APPLICATION 
 
Finally, the water tech firms (W1, W2) both iterated their value propositions, reorienting them along SDL lines. 
W1 shifted its claims away from early detection and monitoring toward eradication and emphasized how “Specific, Efficient, 
Scalable” and “Low Cost” their solution was. W2 dropped some marginally beneficial aspects from its original value 
proposition and added new benefits, including an additional revenue stream on which its customers could capitalize. Table 
5 illustrates W1’s value proposition iterations in more detail. 
Table 5. W1’s value proposition iterations. 
Written value proposition 
from kickoff deck 
“Solutions: Early Detection”; emphasizes novelty, flexibility, cost (Slide 8) 
“Solutions: Equipment”; emphasizes automation, data quality (Slide 9) 
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“Solutions: Eradication”; emphasizes specificity and low cost (Slide 10) 
Spoken value proposition 
(interview 1) 
“… Early detection prevention costs about one-tenth of the cost of annual maintenance. ...You save 90 
percent of your money each year you do an early detection and monitoring as opposed to doing treatment. 
The second stage of that is this is a massive market. There's about two billion dollars spent annually on 
invasive species. Mitigation, about half of that is spent of zebra and quahog mussels. They are also spreading 
rapidly. It's an immediate problem that needs to be solved.” 
Written value proposition 
from Demo Day deck 
"[W1] Eradication = Specific, Efficient, Scalable 
Species Specific 
Proven Technology in Oncology and Human Health Applications 
Large Scale Production at Low Cost" (slide 9) 
Spoken value proposition 
(interview 2) 
"one, detect [invasive species] earlier so that you can mitigate the problem or eradicate the problem 
immediately. Two, if an issue has been detected, there are methodologies that have been successful at early 
stage or low biodiversity stage. They can be eradicated. ... we're developing a chimeric protein that's very 
specific to only killing zebra mussels and nothing else in the environment. ... we're ... developing an 
automated sampler that can be installed at problem points and sample the water remotely. You can save time 
and money. You don't have to send out people constantly to go surveying." 




In sum, based on feedback from mentors, firms did iterate their value propositions, and generally from GDL to 
SDL. 
Firms’ points in the Vogel cycle 
Finally, as discussed earlier, SEAL was an accelerator program focused on the concept stage: ideally, firms have 
already developed a venture idea before entering the program, and seek to incubate a venture concept, shaping and refining 
it as they learn about the customer segment, customer needs, and their own resources and capabilities. By the end of SEAL, 
firms should reach the evaluation point (the Go/No Go decision). After SEAL, firms might seek to enter the next stage, in 
which they exploit the venture opportunity.  
However, not all firms were in the concept stage (Figure 3). Some firms, such as T1 and I1, were either still in or 
barely out of Stage 1: they were still developing a venture idea. Others, such as W2, had already passed into Stage 3: they 
had made their evaluation and were already exploiting the venture opportunity. Those who were solidly in Stage 2, such as 
W1, appeared to get the most from the program. Three examples follow. 
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Stage 1: Idea. T1 had developed practical levitation technology for his master’s thesis. Just before SEAL, he 
decided to commercialize that technology: He told us in the first interview that he had been thinking about commercializing 
the technology for “a week.” At the beginning of SEAL, he was still in Stage 1, developing a venture idea. His initial pitch 
focused on a number of potential applications for the technology, from pallets to levitating skateboards to amusement park 
rides, but he had not explored specific markets for any of these ideas. Not surprisingly, in the initial mentor survey, mentors 
commented that T1’s pitch “is a tech right now” and T1 should be “developing a project/ biz plan.” Similarly, mentors 
commented that I1’s problem statement “was a bit muddled” and “vague,” and one cautioned that I1 had not thought through 
the competitive landscape.  
Stage 2: Concept. W1 was firmly in Stage 2, incubating the venture concept. Although W1 had already joined a 
bioscience incubator and had begun contacting potential market members and discussing sales, W1 was still identifying 
possible markets and evaluating whether the venture concept could turn into an opportunity. In the initial mentor survey, 
mentors rated W1 most highly; their qualitative comments praised W1 for identifying a “clear need, application” and 
“Addressing important problem,” and their criticism centered on execution: “What is it going to take to get this done?”  
Stage 3: Opportunity. W2, which had been developing for two years with the help of four incubators and 16 
mentors, was already past the evaluation point and well into Stage 3, exploiting the venture opportunity. Not surprisingly, 
W2’s representative claimed that he did not find SEAL especially helpful. The structured programming would have been 
useful earlier in his firm’s development, he said, but in his view, the structured programming did not adequately 
communicate startup risks or provide critical feedback. He suggested that the program be structured to facilitate customer 
discovery, like 3-Day Startup. In the initial survey, one mentor commented that although a basic problem had been identified, 
“Your challenge this summer will be transitioning [W2] from a product into a business”—a move that would involve 
thoroughly investigating the size, characteristics, and needs of the market as well as the product’s lifespan.  
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Based on these findings, SEAL did support firms as they iterated their value propositions and developed their 
Go/No Go arguments. All teams iterated their value propositions, largely due to individual, unstructured feedback from 
mentors. Yet we have identified gaps in this support, gaps that meant that SEAL did not evenly teach teams how to develop 
more persuasive value propositions.  
One gap was due to a mismatch between SEAL’s envisioned technology orientation and the actual orientations of 
firms. SEAL was set up to support firms that had developed a technology and sought a problem to which it could be applied, 
and had developed a firm venture idea that they were ready to incubate as a venture concept. Yet, out of the eight selected 
teams, only two had a genuine technology-first orientation (H2, T1); two others partially fit this orientation (W1, W2). Of 
these four teams, only two were actually in the incubation stage (H2, W1), with the other two being in either the venture 
idea stage (T1) or the venture opportunity stage (W2).  
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Another gap was in the program itself. Specifically, although the program implicitly attempted to reorient firms 
from GDL to SDL, it did not offer explicit instruction in how to reorient. Consequently, teams varied widely in terms of 
how much they reoriented, with some teams (e.g., T1) retaining a GDL orientation even at the end. 
A third gap had to do with stage. Although SEAL was set up as an incubator—incubating the venture concept—
some teams were at the previous or subsequent stage, either still working on their venture idea or already exploiting their 
venture opportunity.  
Implications 
Given what we know about the idea-to-opportunity process, the go/no go decision, GDL and SDL, and value 
proposition iteration, this study suggests several implications for entrepreneurship training programs like SEAL. 
Problem 1: Funnel. SEAL cannot cover the entire journey from venture idea to concept to opportunity; instead, it 
covers the concept development (incubation) stage up to the evaluation point (the Go/No Go decision). However, SEAL’s 
wide “funnel”—its broad set of criteria for participating firms—drew in firms that were outside the concept development 
stage. These firms ranged in age (from a week to over two years), experience (from shallow experience in a single accelerator 
to deep experience with several entrepreneurship programs and mentors), orientation (from technology-first to problem-
first), business development stage (from an initial idea to initial sales), and sector (information technology, healthcare, 
transportation, water technology).  
Problem 2: Persuasion. New entrepreneurs face an audience problem. During the venture concept stage (i.e., 
incubation), entrepreneurs who are attempting to commercialize a new technology need to understand customer segments, 
customer needs, and resources and capabilities in order to refine their venture concept and propose it. That is, they must 
develop a value proposition as a proposal claim that finds agreement among channels to users, customers, or funders who 
can provide essential resources to new ventures. Yet existing entrepreneurial approaches have typically not treated the value 
proposition as a claim to be developed and thus have not provided strong principles or guidance on how to iterate such 
claims; value propositions were usually taught with examples, formula statements, or anecdotes rather than structured 
exercises and principles. SEAL offered implicit, but not explicit, guidance for improving persuasion—guidance that largely 
came from the unstructured component, via mentors. 
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Problem 3: Structured programming. SEAL’s wide funnel allowed it to help many kinds of firms. As a result, 
SEAL’s structured programming was provided at a general level and did not correspond to the needs of some firms. For 
instance, one Lunch and Learn was only relevant to the three firms built on funded research. Structured programming was 
also geared for the incubation stage: it was too elementary for experienced firms in the concept stage such as W2, yet too 
advanced for new firms still in the idea stage such as T1. Nevertheless, all firms were required to participate in all structured 
programming. 
Problem 4: Varying mentorship. In addition to this standardized programming, firms received customized 
feedback from mentors. However, these mentors varied in their levels of participation, and thus some firms received much 
more feedback than others. Additionally, mentors varied in their level of domain expertise. Finally, although some mentors 
took on an ad hoc coordination role, this did not happen for all firms. Thus mentorship was inconsistent from firm to firm 
and did not provide enough customization to address all firms’ individual needs.  
Due to these problems, SEAL had a difficult time offering the right guidance for helping firms to develop more 
persuasive value propositions. We offer the following recommendations for accelerator programs similar to SEAL: 
Recommendation 1: Narrow the funnel. Accelerators focused on venture concept incubation should narrow their 
funnel so that programming can serve more specific needs. Specifically, they should (1) specialize in technology-first firms 
and (2) serve only firms in the concept development stage. By narrowing the funnel, such accelerators can better address 
needs such as access to mentors, potential customers, channels and individuals who could advocate for firms to be considered 
by funding groups. Feedback from these key individuals provides data to base value proposition iteration models so that the 
product can better fit market needs and funder interest. Doing so would allow SEAL to more effectively customize structured 
programming and select specific mentors, providing a more cohesive experience and addressing more specific persuasion 
needs.  
Recommendation 2: Explicitly teach persuasion strategies. Firms had learned much from structured 
programming and mentors, but what they learned about value proposition iteration was implicit and unsystematic. Perhaps 
for this reason, firms generally iterated their value propositions in only one or two ways.  
For this reason, entrepreneurship training programs such as SEAL should explicitly teach value proposition iteration 
strategies, aligning them with the incubation stage. Specifically, value propositions could be taught as claims and reinforced 
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with exercises that encourage entrepreneurs to explore how different claims can persuade different stakeholders. 
Furthermore, exercises could help firms to recapitulate their core claims across the various genres they must produce, from 
elevator pitches to funding pitches to marketing materials. 
Recommendation 3: Supplement structured and unstructured programming with semistructured 
programming. In addition, entrepreneurship programs such as SEAL should supplement (standardized) structured 
programming and (customized) mentorship with a third (semi-customized) set of activities. In SEAL, after Lunch and 
Learns, firms could receive “homework”: a set of exercises that allow them to apply standard principles to their specific 
firms. This homework can include incubation-stage topics such as customer discovery, customer validation, pivoting, and 
value proposition iteration. Such guided exercises could help firms to apply standard principles such as SDL to their own 
unique circumstances. Furthermore, they can provide a feedback loop that puts firms in dialogue with market representatives, 
giving them guidance in seeking, gathering, and interpreting feedback from representative stakeholders (cf. [3]).  
Recommendation 4: Supplement mentors with a case manager. Finally, although some firms had a mentor who 
took on an ad hoc coordination role, other firms did not. Thus mentorship was inconsistent and sometimes did not address 
firms’ individual needs—a problem especially for those who needed help in iterating their value propositions, since this help 
largely came from the unstructured component. To address this issue, a lead mentor or “case manager” could be assigned to 
each firm in order to coordinate other mentors, connect structured programming to firms’ individual cases, and discuss the 
results of their “homework.” Further, the “case manager” can offer links to more specific mentors or advisors with tailored 
experience or insight to address entrepreneurs’ needs.  In short, the “case manager” could guide teams through the venture 
concept stage to the evaluation point (the Go/No Go decision).  
We believe that these changes could improve the accelerator program by simplifying the audience and explicitly 
teaching persuasion strategies suitable for that audience (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Proposed structure. 
Finally, we see implications for professional communication as well. As noted, professional communication 
scholars have not focused much on entrepreneurship communication, with a few exceptions (e.g., [28, 16, 17]). Yet 
entrepreneurship involves many persuasive genres and revolves around concerns of persuasion. In this study, we have 
demonstrated how a qualitative case study can apply the concepts and concerns of professional communication to better 
understand this highly persuasion-oriented activity. We hope that this case study approach can encourage professional 
communicators to intensely study other examples in which people develop claims, both inside and outside of 
entrepreneurship communication.  
 Limitations 
This qualitative case study approach has allowed a close examination of how teams iterated their value propositions 
and how those choices were supported by SEAL. The corresponding drawback of this approach is that, as with all case-
based qualitative research, the case study’s generalizability is limited by the small sample size. The qualitative case study 
approach has inherent limitations of scale: the triangulated qualitative analysis performed here may not show systemic issues 
that would be uncovered with a much larger dataset of firms. Nevertheless, these data provide measures concerning how 
data is incorporated by prospective entrepreneurs into evolving and market-responsive value propositions, thus encouraging 
(or discouraging) entrepreneurial entry decisions. Finally, this qualitative analysis of value proposition iteration should 
ideally be quantified to allow more precise and consistent metrics for startup teams in the venture concept stage. 
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Postscript: Where is W1 Now? 
We informally interviewed W1 in May 2019. W1 is now in the exploitation stage, providing services to clients. In 
that stage, W1 has continued to iterate its value proposition, linking its offerings into a “life cycle”: “So we focus it now on 
a whole life cycle process. So before we first started, we were talking about prevention. Then we moved to let's focus on 
mitigation. So we found that trying to do one or the other and then we soon start saying we do all these things, it looks to 
the client like we're trying to boil the sea.” To address that perception, W1 has updated its value proposition: “So now our 
value proposition is we're your one stop shop for all things, prevention, mitigation and we're working on eradication.” And 
it has positioned its sales approach in service of that value proposition: “We are a turnkey solution…  just a service agreement 
contract. We'll install it, we'll tell you what's going on, all you have to do is send us the stuff. So it's low impact, low cost.” 
That is, W1 had continued to learn, and to iterate the value proposition, beyond the venture concept phase supported by 
SEAL. 
W1 concluded with the main takeaway from SEAL: “the issue is still -- and I didn't understand then but I do much 
more now, is to be more proactive and see the problems coming down the road before they hit you, as opposed to being 
reactive and reacting to the problems that we have.”  
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